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ABSTRACT
Domestic value added in exports has lately become a key measure of 
a country’s global competitiveness. This paper analyses the potential 
drivers of the differences in domestically generated value added in 
exported goods between ‘new’ (CEE-10) and ‘old’ (EU-15) countries. 
The analysis focuses on the role played by intangible investments, 
human capital and foreign direct investment. By studying export 
performance at the industry level for the period 2000–2011, this 
paper finds that differences in the share of domestically generated 
value added depend on investments in intangible capital, in particular 
investments in research and development. CEE-10 countries suffer 
from a distinct lack of investments in intangible capital, which is 
currently only sufficient to enable their mere participation in global 
value chains. Further, inward F.D.I. causes a reduction in demand for 
domestic inputs for both groups of countries and hence lowers D.V.A. 
in exports, while CEE-10 countries are also found to be upgrading 
global value chains by undertaking outward F.D.I.
1. Introduction
With the emergence of global value chains (henceforth G.V.C.s), different countries in 
the production chain add value before final consumption. Consequently, most of today’s 
exports are not fully or originally produced in the exporting country since it incorporates 
a certain share of imported intermediate goods (Cheng & Fukumoto, 2010). Therefore, 
around one-fifth of a country’s exports represents other countries’ value added in imported 
intermediates.
Domestic value added (henceforth D.V.A.) in a country’s exports indeed represents an 
important measure of income from trade and thus acts as an important guideline for devel-
opment policy (Caraballo & Jiang, 2016). Namely, the high country’s volume of exports is 
not necessarily reflected in its economic growth as it was in the past, since only the domestic 
part of the country’s total exports contributes to its G.D.P. (UNCTAD, 2013).
Focusing on the E.U. countries, some features of D.V.A. in export dynamics can 
be identified (Figure 1). First, in the period 1995–2011 a general downward trend in 
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D.V.A. in exports in all sectors is evident, which may be seen using different measures 
of D.V.A. in exports (Daudin, Rifflart, & Schweisguth, 2011; Dean, Fung, & Wang, 2007; 
Hummels, Ishii, & Yi, 2001; Johnson & Noguera, 2012; Koopman, Powers, Wang, & 
Wei, 2010; Koopman, Wang, & Wei, 2014). Second, the manufacturing sector has the 
lowest shares of D.V.A. in export shares compared to services and natural resources, 
which may indicate the greater fragmentation of cross-border production (Johnson & 
Noguera, 2012). Third, a structural break may be observed after 2009 when the trend 
value of D.V.A. in exports suddenly increased by a great margin. Regarding this sudden 
increase in D.V.A., Stehrer and Stöllinger (2013) argue that the crisis may have caused 
firms to start re-shoring part of their offshore activities, which led to higher D.V.A. in 
exports, especially if such re-shoring activities were present in sectors with relatively 
high foreign V.A. in exports. Fourth, although export restructuring within the CEE-10 
countries caused the D.V.A. gap to decline relative to the EU-15 countries after 2003, 
the CEE-10 countries still have a systematically smaller share of D.V.A. in exports 
compared to the EU-15 countries.
Since many debates on global value chains ultimately converge on the question of how 
to upgrade or move up the value chain (Sydor, 2011),1 it is becoming ever more important 
to understand the drivers of high-value activities that contribute to greater domestic con-
tent in exports. Besides the fact that higher domestic value added in exports is associated 
with larger or more developed countries (higher income per capita) and countries that 
are geographically farther from the ‘headquarter’ economies (Kowalski, Lopez Gonzalez, 
Ragoussis, & Ugarte, 2015; Stehrer & Stöllinger, 2015), research (OECD, 2013; Stehrer & 
Stöllinger, 2015) shows that progress in G.V.C. upgrading can be attributed to a larger stock 
Figure 1. share (%) of domestic value added in exports for core E.U. countries (EU-15) and E.U. countries 
from central and Eastern Europe (cEE-10), 1995–2011, by sector groups. source: W.i.o.D. tables, own 
calculations.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA  647
of knowledge-based capital (or intangible assets) and more sophisticated exports. Indeed, 
intangible assets represent crucial non-material resources that enable a firm’s upgrading 
and are required for the creation of new or improved products and processes (Arrighetti, 
Landini, & Lasagni, 2014; OECD, 2013), while more sophisticated exports signal a country’s 
greater accumulation of skills and capacities (Stehrer & Stöllinger, 2015).
This paper considers which factors may be relevant for countries to focus on in order 
to ‘capture’ more domestic value from their exports. Following the major findings of 
existing research and given the limitations on data availability, this paper’s primary 
research question considers what is mainly driving the differences in D.V.A. shares 
between EU-15 and CEE-10 countries by exploring the roles of intangible investments, 
human capital and F.D.I. (the latter represents an important driver of participation 
in G.V.C.s). Although both groups (EU-15 and CEE-10) are very heterogeneous, this 
division, while nominally resulting from their later accession to the EU, is based on 
the fact that CEE-10 had relatively recently undergone the transition from socialist to 
market economies. This feature provides a common reference for these countries in 
particular vis-a-vis those of EU-15. To decompose each country’s exports into domestic 
and foreign content, the Koopman et al. (2010) methodology and data from the World 
Input-Output Database (henceforth W.I.O.D. ; Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, & Stehrer, 
2015) are used.
The results provide a solid basis for understanding whether the CEE-10 countries 
can gain in terms of D.V.A. from higher investments in intangible capital and improved 
human capital as well as what is the possible different impact of F.D.I. investments 
in both the CEE-10 and EU-15. The paper goes beyond the analysis of Koopman et 
al. (2010) by exploring the determinants of D.V.A. in exports in E.U. countries and 
explaining the heterogeneity among two groups of E.U. countries in their D.V.A. in 
exports using industry-level data. Further, the existing empirical studies largely focus 
on evaluating the determinants that may facilitate the establishment of supply links, 
namely those: influencing foreign value added (F.V.A.) in exports (Rahman & Zhao, 
2013; Stehrer & Stöllinger, 2015), of participation in G.V.C.s (Kowalski et al., 2015; 
Stehrer & Stöllinger, 2015; Van der Marel, 2015) and of trade in value added (Baldwin 
& Taglioni, 2011; Brooks & Ferrarini, 2012; Cheng & Fukumoto, 2010; Choi, 2013; 
Noguera, 2012).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the existing empirical 
research evidence on the determinants of D.V.A. (F.V.A.). Section 3 describes the regression 
specification and presents the results, while section 4 concludes.
2. Potential factors of value added in exports
Although the theoretical and empirical literature regarding G.V.C. trade is developing very 
quickly, the G.V.C. literature is mainly empirical. Stehrer and Stöllinger (2015) research 
potential factors that foster or hinder the further economic integration of the manufactur-
ing sector. Assuming Germany to be the ‘anchor’ of the Central European supply chain, 
this enables them to use the classical gravity model (country-level version) and thus to 
introduce ‘distance to Germany’ and ‘relative G.D.P. to Germany’ as control variables. They 
find that greater inward F.D.I. is associated with higher foreign content in gross exports 
and that larger countries tend to have, ceteris paribus, a lower F.V.A., but they do not find a 
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statistically significant result between outward F.D.I. and F.V.A. in exports. Similarly, using 
TiVA data for 57 countries Kowalski et al. (2015) find a positive and significant correla-
tion between F.V.A. and revealed openness to F.D.I. (measured as a share of inward F.D.I. 
stock as a percent of G.D.P.). As they explain in their analysis, in the observed countries 
inward F.D.I. is likely to be more related with imports of foreign intermediates for export 
processing. They also find that the larger the distance from the main manufacturing hubs, 
the lower the F.V.A. in exports.
Regarding the skill structure of the workforce, Stehrer and Stöllinger (2015) find a neg-
ative coefficient for medium-skilled labour, suggesting that more medium-skilled labour 
(including an important group of skilled production workers) reduces F.V.A. Surprisingly, 
they do not find any correlation of F.V.A. in exports with the share of high-skilled labour. 
They also determine a negative correlation for export sophistication since, as they explain, 
the more sophisticated a country’s export base is, the greater the country’s skills and capac-
ities. Hence, the country uses fewer imported inputs and thus decreases the F.V.A. share 
in exports.
An important function of promoting an upgrade in G.V.C.s can be attributed to invest-
ment in knowledge-based capital (or intangible assets), which is also an essential source 
of competitiveness (De Backer & Miroudot, 2014). Intangible assets represent the set of 
resources that promote a firm’s upgrading of its G.V.C. activities (OECD, 2013) or the crucial 
non-material resources required for new or improved products and processes to be created 
or sold (Arrighetti et al., 2014). Strategic resources define a firm’s capacities which are com-
pared to the capacities of the firm’s competitors, and provide a platform for the creation of 
greater value added in G.V.C.s (OECD, 2013). Following Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005), 
intangible assets are classified in three main groups: (1) Computerised information; (2) 
Innovative property; and (3) Economic competencies. The first group includes software and 
databases, the second encompasses science and engineering R&D, non-science innovation 
efforts such as product design, copyrights and trademarks, while the third group relates to 
brand equity, firm-specific technological and managerial skills, networks and organisational 
structure. The importance of economic competencies for competitiveness is pointed out by 
a survey of Japanese firms, with manufacturing skills, brand and customer recognition and 
agile and flexible organisation being the crucial ones (OECD & World Bank Group, 2015). 
The survey results suggest that globalised firms’ advantage lies in their larger distribution 
of knowledge-based capital forms that are more difficult to copy or imitate (OECD, 2013).
The OECD (2013) studies the role of knowledge-based capital (proxied by intangi-
ble capital stock) in G.V.C. upgrading. Using data from the Intan-Invest database for 
14 European countries (where only two countries in the sample belong to the CEE-10 
group), they find that a larger stock of knowledge-based capital stimulates greater value 
added in exports (measured in V.A.X. terms). They find notable differences in size and 
significance when they observe estimated coefficients among the three subgroups of 
intangible capital (computerised information, innovative property and economic com-
petencies). Among all subgroups, the coefficient on economic competencies appears 
to be the largest and most significant, while for computerised information it is con-
siderably smaller and non-significant. Jona-Lasinio, Manzocchi, and Meliciani (2016) 
use the same data for 14 European countries and find that intangible assets contribute 
positively to both forward and backward participation.2 R&D and training and organi-
sational capital seem to be more important for forward participation while market and 
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advertising seem to be more relevant for backward participation. They also find that 
intangible assets positively affect value appropriation (higher D.V.A. relative to F.V.A.).
Caraballo and Jiang (2016, p. 294) focus on the determinants that may explain the 
‘value-added erosion’ and find that an increase in the foreign high-skilled labour share 
embodied in a country’s imports has a negative impact on the share of value added 
generated by exports. In addition, they find a positive correlation between the tariffs 
applied to manufactured products and the D.V.A. share, suggesting that countries which 
practise greater protectionism or have strong industrial policies are likely to increase 
their D.V.A. share in exports. Albeit with smaller significance, Caraballo and Jiang 
(2016) also find a positive correlation between the number of patent applications made 
by residents and the D.V.A. share.
However, for firms seeking to upgrade their role in G.V.C.s based on the formation of 
knowledge-based capital access to finance is vital in this process. As noted by Manova 
and Yu (2012, 2016), strengthening capital markets represents an important precondi-
tion since, as presented in their study, credit-constrained exporting firms from China 
are likely to conduct pure assembly with low value added (thereby earning low profits) 
compared to less financially constrained firms which conduct import and assembly or 
even normal trade. However, as explained by the O.E.C.D. (2013) financial development 
might have a more significant contribution to D.V.A. (in V.A.X. terms) in emerging 
economies. Namely, its study sample includes European economies that have rela-
tively developed (advanced) financial institutions which may explain the insignificant 
coefficient on the measure of financial development when D.V.A. is regressed on the 
financial development indicator.
The key ideas from the existing research findings suggest that the main factors that 
could improve firms’ movement towards the upper levels of the global value chain are 
more sophisticated exports, a larger stock of knowledge-based capital, an increase in patent 
applications and better financial development. In addition, lower F.V.A. in exports can be 
found in larger or more developed countries (higher income per capita) and countries that 
are geographically farther from the ‘headquarter’ economies.
The next section follows the main findings while analysing the impact of possible D.V.A. 
determinants in exports in each group of E.U. countries.
3. Empirical strategy
3.1. Regression specification
If a conclusion is drawn based solely on the observations and findings already presented, 
one could say there is a significant difference in the share of D.V.A. in exports between 
the CEE-10 and the EU-15. This paper attempts to explain these D.V.A. differences in 
exports between the two groups of countries by analysing possible determinants that are 
expected to drive the share of D.V.A. in exports. As mentioned by Kowalski et al. (2015), 
there is no common principle for exploring the determinants of G.V.C. trade so I rely on 
the theoretical predictions concerning upgrading within G.V.C.s and predominantly on 
the existing research findings. To distinguish between the two groups of E.U. countries, 
a dummy variable (CEE) is introduced in order to compare the partial elasticities. The 
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indicator variable is interacted with each of the selected variables and thus the following 
empirical specification is estimated:
 
where DVA represents the estimated measure of D.V.A. in exports as a share of total exports 
relating to country i, industry j and time t. ɛijt is the random error term, while μ’s are 
country-, industry- and time-fixed effects. Xijt−1 represents the vector of explanatory varia-
bles, Xijt−1xCEE represent interaction terms between the explanatory variable and the CEE 
dummy variable, where CEE = 1 if the observation belongs to the CEE-10 and CEE = 0 for 
the EU-15. All variables are transformed using a natural logarithm which allows the coef-
ficients to be interpreted as elasticities. A unit of observation in the fixed-effect estimation 
is a country-industry pair.
The main explanatory variables (X) included in equation (1) are business enterprise 
research and development expenditure as a share of value added (BERD) as a form of intan-
gible capital investments, human capital proxied by skill intensity (SKILL) measured as a 
share of hours worked by high-skilled workers in total hours worked, openness to F.D.I. as 
a share of inward F.D.I. stock in G.D.P. (IFDI), firms’ capability of economic integration as 
a share of outward F.D.I. stock in G.D.P. (OFDI), the share of exports to the EU’s five most 
developed countries (EXPTOP5) and the share of imports from the EU’s five most developed 
countries (IMPTOP5), imports of intermediates from China as a share of total intermediates 
consumption (IMintCHN) and hourly wage as a proxy for productivity (WAGE).
All regression specifications are estimated with a fixed-effects model, which allows a 
correlation between the vectors of industry- and country-specific time-invariant effects (μij) 
and the independent variable. The Sargan–Hansen test statistic confirms the fixed effects as 
more appropriate than the random-effects model, meaning that unobservable factors (i.e., 
shocks in business cycles, differences between industries, culture and history, participation 
in G.V.C.s) are important for determining D.V.A. in exports. In all regressions, standard 
errors are calculated using White’s heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
To reduce potential concerns with endogeneity and to allow for a deferred reaction of 
D.V.A., all explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Further, in the robustness check 
the explanatory variables are also lagged by two and three years. As an alternative method 
for estimating the regression model, I also employ the difference G.M.M. estimator in the 
robustness check.
However, when considering the effect of selected determinants on D.V.A. in exports, the 
fact that the causality can also operate in the other direction has to be taken into account. 
A possible endogeneity problem can exist between some independent variables and the 
dependent variable. For example, a higher share of R&D can lead to higher D.V.A., but the 
direction of causation may also be reversed, i.e., a higher share of D.V.A. can lead to higher 
R&D investments. The same problem can appear with IFDI and WAGE. The endogeneity 
problem could also arise due to the measurement error (regressors correlated with the 
regression error ɛijt). In my case, the regression error can, for example, be correlated with 
SKILL due to the omission of ability and quality of education. In addition, there are other 
omitted and unobservable variables correlated with D.V.A. such as managerial skills or 
firm-specific investments. Thus, the purpose of my research is not to determine the existence 




훾 + 휇i + 휇j + 휇t + 휀ijt
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of a direct causal relationship between the selected determinants and D.V.A., but to examine 
the conditional correlations of individual factors with D.V.A.
3.2. Data and descriptive statistics
To undertake my analysis, I combine several datasets available at the industry level for 
EU-25 countries in the period 2000–2011. The main data used come from the World 
Input–Output Tables (W.I.O.T.), which serve as a basis for estimating the shares of 
D.V.A. discussed above.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main regression. It 
includes averages at the industry level, separately for both groups of countries. Lower invest-
ments in intangible capital, a lower share of skilled labour, lower O.F.D.I. investments, a 
lower hourly wage etc. can be observed for the CEE-10 compared to the EU-15.
The greatest problem lies in gathering the data for intangible investments at the industry 
level. To capture the role of intangible capital investments, I rely on business enterprise 
research and development expenditure (BERD). This is the only available proxy for intan-
gible investments on the industry level for all E.U. countries provided by Eurostat and can 
be used as a measure of innovation (Bogliacino, Piva, & Vivarelli, 2012; Klette & Førre, 
1998). The bottleneck regarding the BERD data is the variety in the annual and sectoral 
availability of data for an individual country. BERD expenditure data are divided by value 
added generated in the same industry. Figure 2 shows the differences and variability of 
these values across countries. Among the EU-15 countries, these investments are highest in 
Denmark while for the CEE-10 they are highest in the Czech Republic. In manufacturing 
industries, the biggest investments are recorded in the industries Leather and Footwear, 
Electrical and Optical Equipment and Transport Equipment. The highest value of the BERD. 
coefficient indicates that firms can benefit from greater investments in intangible capital in 
their process of upgrading within G.V.C.s.
The empirical literature offers no clear evidence on the relationship between innovation 
and involvement in a G.V.C. A country’s participation in G.V.C.s may affect its innovation 
performance in either direction, as Felice and Tajoli (2015) explain. They refer to Eaton 
and Kortum (2001) when mentioning that the international fragmentation of production 
may increase the incentive for investment in R&D based on stronger foreign demand for 
domestic inputs. As participation’s negative effect, they mention the decrease in the incentive 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the main regression, manufacturing (mean values 
2000–2011).
athe difference between EU-15 and cEE-10 is significant at p < 0.001.
source: author’s calculations.
Variables EU-15 CEE-10
DVAijt (%) 69.06 61.98
a
BERDijt (%) 4.76 1.82
a
IFDIijt (%) 1.09 1.10
OFDIijt (%) 1.14 0.09
a
SKILL ijt (%) 17.88 10.76
a
WAGEijt ($) 28.74 5.88
a
IMintCHN ijt (%) 1.30 1.38
EXPTOP5ijt (%) 42.38 38.17
a
IMPTOP5ijt (%) 41.16 37.10
a
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for innovation and patenting due to possibility of accepting an alternative strategy (based 
on lower costs or the use of foreign technology) for competing in international markets.
Data on inward and outward F.D.I. stocks (IFDI and OFDI) are acquired from Eurostat 
combined with O.E.C.D. data and are available for 11 out of 13 manufacturing industries 
and for all service industries. Kowalski et al. (2015) note that openness to F.D.I. can be 
related to the type and extent of G.V.C. participation. Firms can integrate into G.V.C.s 
through F.D.I. based on mergers and acquisitions by foreign MNEs which can result in 
foreign markets entry, use of new technology, development of new products but also in 
an increase in intermediate imports. However, firms seeking new markets can access host 
countries through F.D.I. with the aim of servicing local markets (Kowalski et al., 2015). In 
exploring the impact of IFDI on D.V.A., a positive value of the inward F.D.I. coefficient would 
indicate that the recipient countries indeed did not increase imports from the countries of 
origin of the F.D.I.s.
As a proxy for international outsourcing (offshoring), I use the outward F.D.I. activ-
ities (OFDI) indicator devised by Kleinert (2003). The measure only comprises the 
production of intermediates within a firm’s or firm group’s boundaries and, as such, is 
not appropriate for measuring offshoring in the case where a firm purchases intermedi-
ates from suppliers outside the firm’s or firm group’s boundaries (Pilat & Wölfl, 2005). 
Another indicator by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) measures foreign outsourcing as 
imported intermediates that are acquired from the same two-digit industry. However, 
it does not consider the situation where outsourced services that were separated from 
the firm group are not classified in the same industry as they were outsourced from 
(Feenstra & Hanson, 1999; Pilat & Wölfl, 2005).
Figure 2. heterogeneity of business enterprise research and development expenditure (BERD) across 
countries. source: Eurostat, oEcD, author's calculations.
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The data source for hourly wages (WAGE) and share of skilled labour (SKILL) is the 
W.I.O.D. Socio-Economic accounts and is available for all industries and countries. For 
the share of skilled labour, I use data of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged 
as a share of total hours worked. I also included data regarding imported intermediates 
from China (IMintCHN) given that China has become the E.U.’s biggest supplier of 
intermediates.3
In addition, I introduced the geographical concentration of trade (by observing the share 
of exports to the EU’s five most developed countries (EXPTOP5) and the share of imports4 
from the EU’s five most developed countries (IMPTOP5)) calculated from World I-O Tables 
available for the entire period and for all industries.5
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the manufacturing sector, which reveals 
the high correlation of WAGE with SKILL and especially OFDI. This may lead to mul-
ticollinearity problems which I address by separately including WAGE and OFDI in 




The results for the manufacturing sector6 are presented in Table 3. All regressions include 
time, industry and country fixed effects. In column (1), I report a specification with the 
main variables of interest while in the following columns (2)–(6) I gradually add in varia-
bles. Due to the high correlation of WAGE with SKILL and WAGE with OFDI, I separately 
include in the regression WAGE (column (4)) or OFDI and SKILL (column (5)). I will use 
the specification shown in columns (4) and (5) as my main regression specification for the 
remainder of the analysis (robustness checks). Column (7) includes nominal GDP to control 
for the size of the country (and excludes WAGE because of high correlation), but there are 
no substantial differences in the main regression coefficients.
The estimates confirm that business enterprise research and development expenditure 
(BERD) is positively correlated with D.V.A. in the EU-15. The estimated association between 
Table 2. correlation matrix for the period 2001–2011 – manufacturing sector.
note: Data for the manufacturing sector. all independent variables are lagged by one year.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
source: author’s calculations.









lnskiLLt−1 0.10*** 0.31*** 1
lniFDit−1 −0.21*** −0.08** −0.17*** 1
lnoFDit−1 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.22*** 1
lnEXPtoP5t−1 −0.22*** 0.01 −0.26*** 0.13** −0.01 1
lnimPtoP5t−1 −0.07*** 0.08*** −0.31*** 0.00 −0.06** 0.59*** 1
lnimintchnt−1 −0.28*** 0.32*** 0.24*** −0.20 −0.03*** 0.01 0.02 1
lnWaGEt−1 0.17*** 0.54*** 0.61*** −0.07** 0.67*** 0.05** 0.04** 0.18***
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Table 3. Determinants of domestic value added in exports in the manufacturing sector – comparison 
between cEE-10 and EU-15 countries, F.E. estimation results.
note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; all variables are in natural logarithm. Explanatory variables are lagged by 
1 year. CEE = 1 if the observation belongs to the cEE-10. CEE = 0 if the observation belongs to the EU-15. Data included 
in the regression cover the period 2000–2010. all regressions include a constant term. Estimation is set up in a way that 
estimation fixed effects appear at the country-year-industry level.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
source: author's calculations.
Dependent variable: In D.V.A. in exports
VARIABLES F.E. (1) F.E. (2) F.E. (3) F.E. (4) F.E. (5) F.E. (6) F.E. (7)
lnBERDt−1 0.0215** 0.0206*** 0.0179* 0.0129* 0.0110 0.0100 0.0139**
(0.00762) (0.00629) (0.00937) (0.00608) (0.00676) (0.00680) (0.00549)
lnBERDt−1 × 
CEE
−0.0264** −0.0271** −0.0258** −0.0151** −0.0126* −0.0126* −0.0126*
(0.00928) (0.00878) (0.00991) (0.00598) (0.00668) (0.00662) (0.00670)
lnSKILLt−1 −0.108** −0.0840* −0.0843*** −0.140*** −0.117**
(0.0443) (0.0383) (0.0251) (0.0306) (0.0424)
lnSKILLt−1 × CEE 0.0754* 0.0119 0.0226 0.110** 0.0908*
(0.0348) (0.0363) (0.0215) (0.0413) (0.0454)
lnIFDIt−1 −0.0204*** −0.0152** −0.0188*** −0.0129* −0.0104* −0.0105 −0.0136**
(0.00493) (0.00575) (0.00439) (0.00637) (0.00475) (0.00709) (0.00468)
lnIFDIt−1 × CEE 0.0104 0.00639 0.0142 0.00123 −0.000478 −0.00306 0.00367
(0.0121) (0.0155) (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0183) (0.0121)
lnOFDIt−1 0.00167 −1.64e-05 0.00038 0.000757
(0.00264) (0.00256) (0.00220) (0.00240)
lnOFDIt−1 × CEE 0.0139* 0.0137*** 0.0148*** 0.0141***
(0.00626) (0.00375) (0.00408) (0.00367)
lnEXPTOP5t−1 0.00360 0.000239 0.0067 0.00296 0.00260
(0.0212) (0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0171) (0.0180)
lnEXPTOP5t−1 
× CEE
−0.0819*** −0.0752*** −0.0796*** −0.0724*** −0.0751***
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0141)
lnIMPTOP5t−1 0.0667 0.0684 0.0674 0.0695 0.0357
(0.0572) (0.0449) (0.0525) (0.0559) (0.0414)
lnIMPTOP5t−1 
× CEE
0.0742 0.0922 0.100 0.0998 0.129**
(0.0748) (0.0581) (0.0661) (0.0674) (0.0521)
lnIMintCHNt−1 −0.00742 0.0013 0.0021 0.00424
(0.00593) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.00600)
lnIMintCHNt−1 
× CEE
−0.0358 −0.0500** −0.0491* −0.0522**









lnGDPt−1 × CEE 0.0825*
(0.0416)
constant −0.690*** −0.596*** −0.592*** −0.506*** −0.694*** −0.769*** −1.652**
(0.116) (0.110) (0.0731) (0.134) (0.0779) (0.215) (0.551)
observations 1,240 1,084 1,084 1,386 1,084 1,084 1,386
R-squared 
(within)
0.666 0.676 0.739 0.744 0.762 0.765 0.754
number of 
industries
11 11 11 11 11 11 11
number of 
countries
23 23 23 23 23 23 23
country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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D.V.A. and BERD for the EU-15 is 0.018 and significant (column (3)), which indicates that 
a 10 percent rise in business enterprise R&D investments in the manufacturing sector is, 
ceteris paribus, correlated with a 0.18 percent increase in D.V.A. The coefficient for the CEE-
10 is 0.026 percentage points lower and statistically significant, which results in a slightly 
negative and significant coefficient for the CEE-10 (joint significance verified by an F-test). 
A possible explanation is that higher investments in intangible capital reduces the need for 
imported inputs in the EU-15, however in the CEE-10 a specific level of investments7 in 
intangible capital is required in order to integrate into a G.V.C.8
Surprisingly, the coefficient on high-skill labour (SKILL) is statistically significant and 
negative, which suggests that, ceteris paribus, in the EU-15 countries firms with a greater 
share of non-production workers negatively affect D.V.A. in exports and that high-skilled 
labour does not contribute (at least not directly) to G.V.C. upgrading in the EU-15. For the 
CEE-10 countries, the effects are smaller, but the overall correlation remains negative. These 
results may also suggest that hours worked by high-skilled employees (relative to total hours 
worked) are not an appropriate measure for the quality of human capital as the same level of 
investment in education can result in diverse sets of skills or skills with a different value in 
the labour market. Further, education can be used as a labour market indicator of capability 
rather than the skills supply source. Since the competencies of an individual are difficult to 
identify and measure, the economic literature commonly uses educational attainment or 
acquired level of education as the estimate (Borghans, Green, & Mayhew, 2001).
I.F.D.I. has a negative sign for the EU-15 in all specifications, as expected. Inward F.D.I. 
can be associated (particularly in the initial stages) with a higher volume of a destination 
country’s imports from the country of origin of F.D.I.s due to increased imports of interme-
diates and capital goods related to the offshoring of production (Aminian, Fung, & Iizaka, 
2007). In manufacturing, inward F.D.I. is, as already found by Stehrer and Stöllinger (2015), 
positively correlated with the share of foreign value added. Interestingly, the difference for 
the CEE-10 in terms of the impact of inward F.D.I. is not statistically different from zero, 
indicating that inward F.D.I. generally leads to reduced demand for domestic inputs and 
hence lower D.V.A. in exports.
In a general sense, outsourcing can support G.V.C. upgrading since it enables firms to 
focus on their core competencies (Mudambi, 2008; Ylömäki, 2016). As noted by Pietrobelli 
and Rabellotti (2011), firms commonly outsource previously internally managed activi-
ties and retain those activities that represent the source of their core competencies. The 
estimation results show, however, that O.F.D.I. is not significant for the EU-15, while the 
difference for the CEE-10 is significant and positive. This means that G.V.C. upgrading by 
undertaking O.F.D.I. is primarily an issue within the CEE-10 countries.
Other variables also reveal some interesting results. The geographical structure of exports 
(the share of exports to the EU’s five most developed countries) seems to be important as 
well, but again only for the CEE-10. As predicted, the higher share of exports from the CEE-
10 to the EU’s most developed countries is negatively correlated with D.V.A. The results 
remain robust in all specifications. Higher imports of intermediate shares from China are, 
as expected, negatively correlated with the D.V.A. share, but only in the CEE-10. Taglioni 
(in World Bank 2016) investigated China’s G.V.C. upgrading and observed that the avail-
ability of Chinese intermediate inputs of higher quality enables its trade partners to gain 
from China’s upgrading process, particularly when imported Chinese intermediates are 
complements to their domestic production instead of substitutes. The negative relationship 
between D.V.A. and imports from China most likely implies that intermediates from China 
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are more substitutes than complements for the CEE-10, although more research on the 
topic is required. Contrary to my expectations, no significant (positive) effects of wage on 
D.V.A. are revealed for either the EU-15 or the CEE-10.
3.3.2. Robustness checks
In order to deal with inherent endogeneity, I employ the difference G.M.M. estimator 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991). As an alternative transformation to the common differencing, I 
Table 4. Determinants of domestic value added in exports in the manufacturing sector – comparison 
between cEE-10 and EU-15 countries, difference G.m.m. estimation results.
notes: Estimates from difference G.m.m. models with time-fixed effects. second- to fourth-level lags of the endogenous 
variables (BERD, IFDI, SKILL and WAGE) were used as instruments in the G.m.m. style. the p-values of the hansen j test of 
overidentifying restrictions and p-values of the arellano and Bond (1991) test of qth order serial correlation are reported 
in brackets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
source: author’s calculations. 
Dependent variable: In D.V.A. in exports
Diff-2 Diff-2 Orth Dev-2 Orth Dev-2
vaRiaBLEs G.m.m. (1) G.m.m. (2) G.m.m. (3) G.m.m. (4)
lnBERDt−1 0.0123* 0.0198* 0.0220*** 0.0473***
(0.00678) (0.0102) (0.00668) (0.0104)
lnBERDt−1 × CEE −0.0137* −0.0247** −0.0166 −0.0384***
(0.00825) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0134)
lnSKILLt−1 −0.0544** −0.116***
(0.0221) (0.0273)
lnSKILLt−1 × CEE 0.00999 0.0654*
(0.0290) (0.0363)
lnIFDIt−1 0.0108*** 0.00387 0.00627 0.00281
(0.00370) (0.00594) (0.00544) (0.00740)
lnIFDIt−1 × CEE −0.0547*** −0.0336** −0.0433*** −0.0435**
(0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0136) (0.0172)
lnOFDIt−1 0.00301* 0.00131
(0.00164) (0.00171)
lnOFDIt−1 × CEE −0.00457 −0.00103
(0.00300) (0.00334)
lnEXPTOP5t−1 −0.0185 0.00973 0.0213 −0.0125
(0.0309) (0.0278) (0.0334) (0.0268)
lnEXPTOP5t−1 × CEE −0.0111 −0.0250 −0.0356 −0.0134
(0.0356) (0.0292) (0.0379) (0.0326)
lnIMPTOP5t−1 0.0160 0.00948 0.0301 −0.00508
(0.0266) (0.0361) (0.0237) (0.0312)
lnIMPTOP5t−1 × CEE 0.0388 0.000546 0.0812* 0.0867*
(0.0434) (0.0450) (0.0430) (0.0505)
lnIMintCHNt−1 −0.0243*** −0.0190** −0.0261*** −0.0325***
(0.00678) (0.00805) (0.00645) (0.00651)
lnIMintCHNt−1 × CEE 0.0409*** 0.0381*** 0.0214* 0.0397***
(0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0119) (0.0119)
lnWAGEt−1 −0.0331*** −0.0566***
(0.0127) (0.0133)
lnWAGEt−1 × CEE 0.00832 0.0659***
(0.0188) (0.0193)
# observations 1,057 811 1,153 873
# country × industry 178 161 210 188
# instruments 280 197 256 179
hansen test 169.6 144.6 206.9 177
(1) (0.983) (0.959) (0.247)
aR(1) test −2.097 −2.610 −2.972 −3.056
(0.0360) (0.00906) (0.00296) (0.00225)
aR(2) test −2.218 −0.554 −2.470 −1.390
(0.0266) (0.580) (0.0135) (0.165)
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used forward orthogonal deviations as proposed by (Arellano & Bover, 1995) which entails 
subtracting the average of available future observations and not the previous observation 
as in the first-difference transformation. The loss of data is minimised since the sample 
size is preserved (Roodman, 2006). To detect any serial autocorrelation problems, auto-
correlation tests were performed. A first-order correlation, but therefore no higher-order 
autocorrelation, supports the assumption of a lack of autocorrelation. The suitability of the 
instrumental variables is examined by Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions where 
an insignificant p-value of the test is preferred.
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the baseline model. All estimations include 
year-fixed effects. Second- to fourth-level lags of the endogenous variables (BERD, IFDI, 
SKILL and WAGE) were used as instruments in the G.M.M. style. The autocorrelation tests 
of the residual show there is a significant first-order autocorrelation, but no significant sec-
ond-order autocorrelations. The Hansen test confirms the validity of the instruments. To 
sum up, the test statistics confirm an appropriate specification. Columns (1)–(2) report the 
two-step difference G.M.M., columns (3)–(4) report the estimation results for the two-step 
difference G.M.M. with a forward orthogonal deviation.
The main results in Table 4 are generally consistent with the fixed-effects model estimates. 
Business enterprise research and development expenditure (BERD) demonstrates a positive 
and significant impact on D.V.A. in exports for the EU-15. The difference for the CEE-10 
is also statistically significant albeit lower, but it does not result in a statistically significant 
coefficient for the CEE-10. The coefficient of high-skilled labour (SKILL) for the EU-15 
is negative and significant as in the basic specification, while for the CEE-10 the negative 
effects are different and smaller only in specification (4).
The results suggest a slightly positive or no effect of IFDI on D.V.A. in exports in the 
EU-15 countries, but a significantly negative effect of IFDI on D.V.A. for the CEE-10 coun-
tries. Empirical evidence shows that OFDI is positive and significant for the EU-15 (col-
umn (2)), while there is no significant difference for the CEE-10. This suggests that G.V.C. 
upgrading by undertaking OFDI may indeed be generally the case.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, I rely on the recent methodology for decomposing gross exports into val-
ue-added exports provided by Koopman et al. (2010) and recent research findings regarding 
the potential factors of value added in exports (Caraballo & Jiang, 2016; Kowalski et al., 
2015; O.E.C.D., 2013; Stehrer & Stöllinger, 2015). I particularly focused on: (1) D.V.A. in 
exports, which represents an important measure of income from trade and can thus be 
recognised as a crucial guideline for development policy (Caraballo & Jiang, 2016); and 
(2) E.U. countries. The main contribution of my research compared to previous work is 
the distinction between CEE-10 and EU-15 countries in order to explain the main drivers 
of the differences in D.V.A. in export shares between EU-15 and CEE-10 countries using 
industry-level data.
Fixed-effects and G.M.M. regression analysis is used to examine whether the selected 
main economic indicators influence D.V.A. in exports differently in each of the two groups 
of E.U. countries. Estimates based on industry- and country-level data show that invest-
ments in intangible capital play an important role in G.V.C. upgrading for the EU-15 
countries, while the results are negative for the CEE-10. A possible explanation is that 
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the CEE-10  lack  investments in intangible capital which are mainly sufficient to enable 
their participation  in a G.V.C., but not above the G.V.C. upgrading threshold. Further 
investigation is required to determine the exact level of the critical threshold of intangible 
investments beyond which the CEE-10 can gain from intangible investments in terms of 
higher D.V.A. in exports. I found that most of the other determinants (O.F.D.I., exports to 
the EU’s most developed countries and imports from China) have different effects on the 
domestic content of exports in CEE-10 than in EU-15 countries. The results, by and large, 
remain robust under alternative specifications.
Based on the presented results, it follows that investments of CEE-10 in intangible capital 
are only sufficient to enable their participation in a G.V.C., but not above the G.V.C. upgrad-
ing threshold. Further investigation is required to determine the exact value of the critical 
threshold of intangible investments beyond which the CEE-10 can gain from intangible 
investments in terms of higher D.V.A. in exports.
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that the subjects which participate in G.V.C.s and 
that should represent the units of analysis are not countries, but firms. However, due to the 
lack of data and methodology, country-industry analysis is still the traditional approach 
used in the literature. Nevertheless, considering the limitations the results presented in this 
paper offer an insight into the possible determinants of E.U. countries’ domestic content of 
exports from the value-added perspective. Most of all, one could improve the methodology 
for decomposing exports into value added terms and use a different source of input-output 
tables to compare the estimated results. Moreover, instead of using industry-level data one 
could extend this research and use firm-level data.
Notes
1.  Upgrading can be described as a process in which firms (economies) move to (production) 
activities with higher valued added in order to increase their gains and profits resulting from 
G.V.C. participation (Gereffi, 2005 in Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011).
2.  Backward participation refers to the foreign value-added content of gross exports. Forward 
participation refers to domestic value-added embodied in foreign exports (Jona-Lasinio et 
al., 2016).
3.  For example, in 1995 the E.U.imported 6 percent of its intermediates from sources outside the 
EU, mainly represented by the USA and the Rest of the world. In 2009, the share increased to 
9 percent and China became a significant supplier to the E.U. with over 1 percent of its total 
intermediates (Gasiorek et al., 2014).
4.  Due to the data unavailability of total imports at the industry level, I use data for imports of 
intermediates.
5.  The decision to include these variables is based on the non-negligible importance of the 
development and size of the economy (country) which an individual country is trading 
with. Countries with high-skilled labour that performs more complex tasks in later stages of 
production usually specialise in products based on costly intermediates, while countries with 
low-skilled labour mainly specialise in basic production. Thus, in a very generalised view, the 
‘rich’ or skilled countries produce more advanced goods with a high value while the ‘poor’ 
countries chiefly focus on basic production, raw materials and goods with a low value (Felipe, 
Kumar, & Abdon, 2014). Although the CEE-10 cannot be classified as poor countries, Cieślik, 
Biegańska, and Środa-Murawska (2016) noted that in post-communist countries high-tech 
products still account for a low share of their exports.
6.  In the services sector BERD and SKILL do not play an important role in the share of D.V.A. 
Estimations show negative and significant elasticities with D.V.A. for IFDI and imports 
of intermediates from China for EU-15 countries, while these results are not significantly 
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different for the CEE-10. Imports from the EU’s most developed countries are positively 
correlated with D.V.A. in exports for EU-15 countries, with no significant difference for the 
CEE-10. Interestingly, in services compared to manufacturing, wage is positively correlated 
with D.V.A. for the CEE-10 countries.
7.  Similarly to relationship-specific investments. These represent investments made by suppliers in 
the value chain in order to obtain a certain required level of compatibility of their components 
with the components of other suppliers (Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, & Conconi, 2015)
8.  The explanation is based on the findings of Stehrer and Stöllinger (2015) for export 
sophistication.
9.  Koopman et al. (2010) provided parallels with measures in previous literature:
- (E) is denoted as VS and (C) + (D) is denoted as VS1 by Hummels et al. (2001).
- (D) is indicated as VS1* by Daudin et al. (2011).
- the sum of (A), (B) and (C) divided by gross exports is the V.A.X. ratio defined by 
Johnson and Noguera (2012).
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Appendix 1. Methodology of measuring value-added in exports
This paper follows the mentioned methodology of measuring value-added in exports developed by 
Koopman et al. (2010, pp. 5–21). This methodology requires the use of inter-country input–output 
tables.
The model assumes an m-country world, where each country produces goods in n tradable sectors, 
and thus the m-country production and trade system can be presented in a block matrix structure 
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This structure shows that all gross output produced by country g is used as an intermediate or 
final good by the home country or by foreign countries (h). Xg thus represents the n × 1 gross output 
vector of country m and each block matrix Agh represents n × n I–O matrix of coefficients that stand 
for intermediate use in country h of goods produced in country g. Ygh denotes the n × 1 final demand 
vector, which represents a country’s h demand for final goods produced in country g.
By reorganizing the Equation (1), the gross output vector X can be expressed as
 
where Bgh represents an n × n Leontief inverse matrix.
Further, the gross export Eg*_ from country g to the world has to be defined by composing the 
final demand matrix Ygh and intermediates AghXh (I-O matrix of coefficients multiplied by gross 
output vector)
 
For measuring domestic and foreign contents the direct value-added coefficient vector Vg (1 × n) is 
defined as one minus the intermediate input share from all countries (with domestically produced 
intermediates counted in), where u is 1 × n unity vector:
 
After certain procedures involving matrix calculations domestic value-added can be expressed as:
 
where Vg represents the direct value-added coefficient vector, Bgg stands for diagonal elements of an 
n x n Leontief inverse matrix, and Eg* is an export matrix.
Finally, the gross export Egh can be broken down into two main categories, domestic value added 
in exports (D.V.A.) and foreign value-added in exports (henceforth F.V.A.). The D.V.A. is further 
divided in several other sources, depending on the stage of production process, whereby (A) repre-
sents a final good, (B) denotes an intermediate product not prepared for further exports, (C) stands 
for intermediates produced for re-export to third countries, and (D) denotes an intermediate that 
returns to the home:
 
Complete decomposition of gross exports into its value added exports is also illustrated in Figure 
A3.9 As mentioned in Koopman et al. (2010), the sum of (D) and (E) represents a part of exports that 
is double counted in official trade statistics. The components (A) and (B) represent the exports of a 
country outside of the supply chain, while components (C), (D), and (E) regard to the exports related 
with the supply chain (Augustyniak, Ebeke, Klein, & Zhao, 2013, p. 9). As mentioned in Koopman 
et al. (2010), the sum of (D) and (E) represents that part of exports that is double counted in the 
official trade statistics, and the sum of (A), (B) and (C) divided by gross exports equals Johnson and 
Noguera’s (2012) V.A.X. ratio. For more details see Koopman et al., 2010.
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Figure A3. Decomposition of gross exports into value-added exports. source: R. koopman, W. Powers, 
Z. Wang, & s.-j. Wei, Give credit Where credit is Due: tracing value-added in Global Production chains 
2010, p. 34.
